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The main aim of this study is to explore the breadth of the inference field and the
type of etiopathogenetic contents of symptom explanations provided by the client and
therapist in the first two psychotherapy sessions conducted using a systemic approach.
Does the therapist use triadic explanations of psychopathology as suggested by her
approach? And do clients resort almost exclusively to monadic and dyadic explanations
as did the university students in our previous study? What kind of explanations do they
propose? The coding system “1 to 3: from the monad to the triad” was applied to the
transcripts of 25 individual systemic therapies conducted by the same therapist. This
manual allows coding of the inference field of symptom explanations according to three
categories: monadic, dyadic, and triadic. These three broad categories are also used
to analyze the etiopathogenetic content of each explanation: traumatic, intrapersonal,
and interpersonal. Our findings showed that clients and their therapist actually used
different inference fields: clients resorted almost exclusively to monadic and dyadic
explanations, whereas their therapist included the triadic explanatory level. Moreover,
the therapist provided more interpersonal explanations than her clients. Hence, the
dissonance between client and therapist about the inference fields – a crucial premise of
one of the most accepted ideas of therapeutic change according to systemic therapies –
is proven, at least among our participants. Thanks to this dissonance, clients and
therapists can create a new story, potentially able to change clients’ feelings, without
disconfirming their emotions.
Keywords: triadic thinking, causal explanations, symptoms, mental disorders, therapeutic change, systemic
psychotherapy, psychopathology, attributions
INTRODUCTION
The context for systemic therapies is the matrix of meaning. As claimed by Watzlawick et al.
(1967) in Pragmatics of Human Communication, perhaps the systemic approach’s best-known text,
“a phenomenon remains inexplicable as long as the range of observation is not wide enough to
include the context in which the phenomenon occurs” (Watzlawick et al., 1967, pp. 20–21). But
how broadly should the field of observation be widened? Until now, systemic therapies have no
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detailed indication in regard to this, but they do foster the idea
that the field of observation should be broadened to at least triadic
contexts and, consequently, the development of triadic heuristics.
One of the specificities that still distinguishes systemic
therapists from colleagues with other approaches is the use
of at least triadic schemes for the explanation of symptoms
and related dysfunctional behaviors (Flaskas, 2012). Almost all
pioneers of systemic and family therapies placed the triad at
the base of their theories and practices. Haley (1969), claimed
that the triad was the minimum unit of observation within the
systemic approach. Before that, Weakland (1960) had provided
a triadic interpretation of the double bind (Bateson et al., 1956),
a core concept of the emerging systemic therapies. Triangles and
triangulations were also at the heart of the clinical developments
of many family therapists, including Zuk (1969), Bowen (1966,
1978), Minuchin (Minuchin et al., 1967; Minuchin, 1974), and
Selvini Palazzoli et al. (1978, 1980).
During the sixties and the seventies, systemic therapies
interpreted the shift of attention from the individual to the triad,
or to broader units, as broadening of the observation field. Back
then, systemic therapies were mainly family therapies, and the
focus was addressed to the here-and-now interactions. Later,
the abandoning of the concept of the mind as a black box, the
resumption of Batson’s original idea of the contextual mind, the
adoption of constructivist paradigms, and the spread of systemic
therapeutic practices addressed to individuals gradually changed
this methodological choice. The broadening of the observation
field is now seen as the broadening of the inference field, that is,
the context taken mentally into account by whoever formulates
the inference. According to this perspective, broadening the
context in which an event occurs is primarily a mental
operation of contextualization; it does not necessarily require the
observation of a triad, or a broader unit, in interaction. Such a
triad, or broader unit, can be not only observed but also evoked.
In this perspective, systemic therapies are now characterized by
the use of triadic inferential processes and by the inclusion of
methods able to elicit them, differentiating themselves from other
psychotherapeutic models which are characterized by monadic
heuristics, based on individual and intrapsychic processes, or
dyadic heuristics, based on the individual relating with a
significant other.
Due to this methodological transformation, systemic therapies
are no longer identified with family therapy and have increasingly
distinguished themselves as a way of thinking that can be
used in different therapeutic settings (Heatherington et al.,
2015). The choice of who to include in therapy – individuals,
couples, families, or siblings – has become a technical decision,
which changes the therapeutic strategy but not the way of
thinking guiding therapy (Boscolo and Bertrando, 1996). Also, in
individual therapies, the therapist envisions the patient and the
therapeutic relationship as part of a broader system that includes
the family contexts of which the client is part, including those not
present during the session. And even in an individual session, one
of the most characteristic interventions for a systemic therapist
when facing disruptive emotions, symptomatic behaviors, or
lacerating conflicts is to contextualize them in an interactional
matrix, involving at least three people.
A brief clinical vignette, taken from the participants of this
study, allows us to clarify the concept of the monadic, dyadic,
and triadic inference fields.1 Sonia, a 30-year-old bulimic patient,
since adolescence, used to go from size 8 to 16 in only 2 months.
She suffered from a devastating hatred for her mother, who,
she blamed for her eating disorder and for all the emotional
difficulties which had troubled her life. Due to this fierce conflict,
Sonia refused to involve her family in therapy, at least at the
beginning. “When I was sixteen, I wanted to throw boiling oil
in my mother’s face and I used to smash doors, and then I would
run and vomit,” Sonia remembered. Since then, many things had
changed, but Sonia’s hostility toward her mother had remained
unaltered, and the belief that her mother was responsible for her
disorder had taken root. “My mother is the cause of my eating
disorder; I have understood it through years of therapy (: : :).
Once I thought I was in the wrong, because I am a coward,
I don’t have the courage to face situations,” added Sonia, who
provided us with a clear example of dyadic explanation of her
pathology (“my mother is the cause of my eating disorder”) and
also an equally good example of monadic explanation (“I thought
I was in the wrong, because I am coward”). Sonia described
herself as the opposite of her mother. The mother was depicted
as a force of nature, a goddess of war, flashy, and full of energy.
“She is awfully self-confident, she always has the courage to
express what she has in mind,” Sonia admitted. The daughter,
of a sober and shy beauty, constructed herself as controlled and
refined, in contrast to her mother. She spoke in a low voice and
dressed understatedly.
But why did Sonia hate her mother so badly? She was
described as imperious, flamboyant, but she had always favored
Sonia over her brothers in the choice of schooling, sports, and
shopping, as the daughter admitted. And how was it that the
father and brothers, who should have had many more reasons for
resentment toward her mother, according to what Sonia reported
to the therapist, did not seem to be gripped by resentment?
This more complex plot, which a systemic therapist usually
constructs when faced with a symptom or a symptomatic
behavior, opens up new questions. For example, what role had
the father and brothers played in fuelling Sonia’s hatred toward
her mother? Did Sonia express a resentment matured in her
relationship with her mother, or did she give voice to the
resentment of other family members? And why did she take on
this task?
These questions are the result of triadic thinking and of
an interviewing technique characterized by so-called circular
and reflexive questions (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980; Tomm,
1987, 1988). Thanks to these techniques, clients, together with
their therapist, become active protagonists in the transformation
of their individual and family story. In the first place, this
triadic thinking is constructed by the clients themselves, through
their answers to the therapist’s reflexive and circular questions.
Secondly, it allows another story to be told respecting the client’s
emotional experience. The therapist does not question Sonia’s
hatred. Once she had understood that the young woman was
so tightly sealed in a narrative that had always set her against
1The therapist is the first author of this study.
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her mother, the therapist tried to explore who and what in the
wider context had contributed to the development of Sonia’s
unrelenting hatred. The therapist’s questions were directed to
bring about a change of gestalt, able to modify Sonia’s feelings
toward her mother, fuelled by a narrated story that wavers
between dyadic explanations, involving only two actors (e.g., “the
one responsible is my mother,” “we are too different,” “she has
always bothered me physically, even when she tried to get close”)
and monadic explanations, focusing only on one person (e.g.,
“I’m too sensitive,” “I’m a chicken,” “unlike my brother, I’m not
able to let things slide on me”).
The hypothesis underlying the therapist’s2 questions was that
other family members had fed the young woman’s aggressiveness
toward her mother. The therapist, according to her model,
considered at least three actors. Her field of inference was made
up of not only Sonia but also her parents and her brothers, even
when they were not present in the therapy. Systemic therapies
have in fact always assumed that triadic patterns are an expression
of the clients’ lived experience, and therefore are plausible and
able to connect the client with silent domains of experience
based on emotions. However, empirical research confirming this
clinical intuition has long been lacking.
For the past 20 years, thanks to the paradigm of research
about mother, father, and child – dubbed Lausanne Triadic Play
(LTP) – developed by Fivaz-Depeursinge and colleagues (Fivaz-
Depeursinge and Corboz-Warnery, 1999; Fivaz-Depeursinge and
Philipp, 2014; McHale et al., 2018), we have had numerous
confirmations that our lived story is a triadic one from the
beginning of our life. In fact, children, from the first months
of life, are able to interact with two partners simultaneously,
alternating the gaze between the two parents, and from 9 months
onward are capable of complex triadic interactions. These
results have been confirmed by longitudinal research in different
countries, which leaves no doubt: our lived experience is
interwoven with plots that are at least triadic from early infancy.
This is not the case for our narrated story, which seems
extraneous to triadic heuristics. The triadic patterns seem
extraneous not only to clinical thinking but also to common
sense, at least in western cultures. An exception to this is jealousy,
which gives rise to three-way games splendidly exemplified in
literature and films, such as Wuthering Heights (Brontë, 1847).
But are there empirical studies able to confirm that common
sense is extraneous to triadic thinking?
To the best of our knowledge, only the study run by Ugazio
et al. (2012) had explicitly set this goal. It focused on the
explanations given by university students to an unexpected
enigmatic symptom-like event: a model student communicates
his or her decision to leave university shortly before graduation,
without giving a reason to his or her parents. This event
2The therapist, who is the first author of this study, as mentioned in the previous
note, already had more information prior to suggesting this hypothesis. In any case,
according to systemic method and practice, this hypothesis, as all the other ones,
is no more than a supposition, useful in suggesting questions with a broad field
of inference (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980). Answering the therapist’s questions,
clients develop, confirm, invalidate, or introduce a new hypothesis different
from the suggested one, thereby expressing their agency threatened by the onset
of the disorder.
was presented through four different stimulus situations,
corresponding to four different levels of the breadth of the
evoked relational context. In the first version, the student was
presented alone, without any contextualization3 (evoked monadic
context); in the second, the student was presented when he or she
communicated his or her decision to his or her mother4 (evoked
dyadic context); and in the third version, his or her decision
was communicated to both parents (evoked triadic context).5 In
the latter, the parents showed opposite emotional responses to
their child’s communication6 (evoked triadic enigmatic context).
The results show that participants made almost exclusive use of
monadic and dyadic explanatory schemes. Only in the triadic
enigmatic stimulus situation, in which the student received two
opposite emotional responses from his or her parents, some
explanations emerged in which three actors were involved in a
single explanatory scheme.
We therefore have firsthand evidence of how unfamiliar
to common sense triadic thinking is also when the stimulus
situations evoked contexts involving more actors, as the systemic
therapists used to do through their interviewing technique. But
what happens when, like in the current study, the event to be
explained is a real symptom and it is the actors themselves, the
clients, who narrate to their systemic therapist their attempts to
give meaning to their symptoms, being actively engaged in the
conversation through circular and reflexive questions? Does the
field of inference change?
The enigmatic event proposed in the previous study did
not put medical culture at stake. When it comes to symptoms,
medical culture can encourage a monadic and linear way of
interpreting them, especially in this historical period where
biological psychiatry has the upper hand (Haslam, 2005;
Pescosolido et al., 2010; Kvaale et al., 2013; Lebowitz, 2014;
MacDuffie and Strauman, 2017; Lebowitz and Appelbaum, 2019).
The students could identify themselves with a colleague who
suddenly decided to drop out of university but were not directly
involved. The motivation of the participants, in this current
study, was incomparably greater than that of the students
involved in the study by Ugazio et al. (2012). The participants’
coherence of the self is threatened by the onset of symptoms,
and the very voids of meaning opening up in the narrative plot
were a powerful stimulus to the participants’ attributive effort.
The request for therapy is also a request for meaning. Patient and
therapist are therefore motivated to seek reasons for symptoms
and other enigmatic behaviors. Precisely because of this joint
3“Sara/Marco is a model student attending Medicine and needs to pass only five
more exams before graduating. From one day to the next she/he decide to pull out
of University.”
4“Sara/Marco is a model student attending Medicine and needs to pass only five
more exams before graduating. From one day to the next she/he decide to pull out
of University and tell her/his mother, who burst into tears.”
5“Sara/Marco is a model student attending Medicine and needs to pass only five
more exams before graduating. From one day to the next she/he decide to pull out
of University and tell her/his parents: her/his mother burst into tears and her/his
father tries to comfort his wife.”
6“Sara/Marco is a model student attending Medicine and needs to pass only five
more exams before graduating. From one day to the next she/he decide to pull out
of University and tell her/his parents: her/his mother burst into tears, while her/his
father seems pleased.”
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commitment of the two conversational partners in meaning-
making, psychotherapy is one of the natural contexts in which the
attributional effort is stronger. This is most true for constructivist
and constructionist approaches, for whom patients’ narratives
and their transformation are crucial.
Furthermore, systemic therapists, by virtue of their theory and
training, should resort to triadic inference fields in explaining
symptomatic behaviors of their clients, but with a few exceptions
(Coulehan et al., 1998), this topic has been left unexplored
and therefore deserves further in-depth investigation. As is well
known (Bowen, 1976; Najavits, 1997; Spurling, 2018), therapeutic
practice is not always consistent with theory, an eventuality
that systemic therapists, like other therapists, cannot avoid
(Wolpert, 2000).
No less interesting is the etiopathogenetic content of the
explanations provided by clients and therapists. For years now,
the scientific debate has tended to put etiopathogenesis of
symptoms in brackets. Moreover, the mainstream of family
therapy has placed a sort of epoché on this subject, a choice
motivated by the difficulty in collecting empirical evidence
capable of demonstrating precise links between family dynamics
and psychopathological disorders, and by attempting to de-
pathologize mental health issues, avoiding diagnostic labels. Also,
the hope to gain better family engagement, avoiding the potential
blame that some families feel in the search of the links between
symptoms and family dynamics, played a role. As a result, for
several years now, the role of family dynamics in the development
of psychological disorders has been somewhat disregarding, and
some family therapists claimed that the participation of the
family does not imply that they play any role in the etiology of
psychopathology (Dare and Eisler, 1997; Lock et al., 2001). These
therapists seem to extend to family therapy what Cerletti said
about electric shock: it works, but we don’t know why. However,
we can assume that patients continue to ask questions about the
origin of their symptoms, a subject that concerns them too closely
to be evaded. But what kind of explanations for their symptoms
do clients propose? Do they prefer interpersonal explanations, as
the choice of a systemic therapist would suggest, or do they prefer
intrapersonal explanations, as some studies (Stratton et al., 1990;
Wolpert and March, 1995; March and Harris, 1996; Wolpert,
2000; Stratton, 2003a,b; Tompkins et al., 2016) suggest?
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
This study explores the inference fields and the type of
etiopathogenetic contents of the client’s and therapist’s
explanations, provided during the first two sessions of systemic
psychotherapy. At least partially, symptoms and symptomatic
behaviors slip away from intentional control, giving back a
self-perception in which people often struggle to recognize
themselves. Therefore, these behaviors are the most enigmatic an
individual can experience, and consequently, they may spur on
attributive effort and complexity of the explanations.
A preliminary aim of our study is to explore who, between
therapist and client, provides a larger number of explanations
about symptoms and symptomatic behaviors.
A second aim, central to our study, is to verify if
clients, when trying to give meaning to their symptoms
along with their therapists, used almost exclusively monadic
and dyadic explanations, very rarely resorting to explanations
able to embrace three actors or more, like the university
students in Ugazio et al. (2012).
A third aim is to test if, even in the first sessions, the systemic
therapist made more use of triadic explanatory schemes than her
clients, as her model suggests.
Finally, our study aims to analyze the content of the
explanations about symptoms provided by the client and
therapist, in order to verify if client and therapist differ in the
type of etiopathogenetic content of their explanations, as found
in other studies (Wolpert and March, 1995; Wolpert, 2000).
The hypotheses of the study are:
Hypothesis 1. Did clients and therapists contribute to a different
extent in providing symptom explanations? We expect that clients
had introduced more explanations than the therapist.
Hypothesis 2. Did monadic and dyadic explanations prevail over
triadic explanations during the therapeutic conversation? We
expect that both clients and the therapist had utilized more
monadic and dyadic explanations than triadic explanations.
Hypothesis 3. Did clients and therapists differ in producing triadic
explanations? We expect that the therapist had utilized more
triadic explanations than her clients.
Hypothesis 4. Did clients and therapists provide different types
of etiopathogenetic explanations about symptoms? We expect
that the therapist had utilized more interpersonal explanations
than their clients.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
This study was carried out on the first two sessions (Mtime = 1 h
21 min; time range: 1 h to 1 h 37 min; SD = 11 min 40 s) of
25 video-recorded and transcribed individual systemic therapies,
conducted by the first author in a private institute.7
The purpose of the first two sessions, preliminary to a possible
psychotherapy, is to understand and contextualize the client’s
problems, to examine their current relational situation and family
history, as well as to negotiate the effective possibilities of the
treatment and its format (individual, couple, or family sessions)
(Ugazio, 1984, 1985a,b, 1989).
The clients presented phobic, obsessive–compulsive, eating, or
depressive disorders, which met the criteria for a full diagnosis
according the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
None of them presented psychotic symptoms or satisfied the
criteria for a psychotic disorder.8
7The therapist is Valeria Ugazio, who carried out the psychotherapies at the
European Institute of Systemic-relational Therapies (www.eist.it), a private
institute based in Milan (Italy), where the video-recordings are stored.
8The first clinical group is composed of nine clients affected by phobic disorders:
two of them with agoraphobia, without a clinical history of panic disorder (F40.00),
three with panic disorder and agoraphobia (F40.00 and F41.0), and four with panic
disorder without agoraphobia (F41.0). The second group is formed by six clients
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All clients were adults (Mage = 38.25 years; age range: 21–
59; SD = 12.41), both genders (11 males and 14 females), with a
high educational level (16 university graduates and 9 high-school
graduates), and except for one 20-year-old university student, all
had steady work. The sessions were individual and conducted
according to the systemic approach. Family members were not
involved, because they were unavailable or explicitly requested
not to be included by the client.
Coding and Classifying Procedure
The coding and classifying system “1 to 3: from the monad to
the triad” (Ugazio et al., 2008) was applied to the transcripts. It
allows to detect the symptom explanations provided by both the
conversational partners and to classify them according to breadth
of inference field. Adopting a contextual approach, this coding
system identifies an explanation as a minimum text unit with an
explicative meaning or as a causal chain, that is, as two or more
minimum text units linked one to another through the same
pattern of semantic coherence. It implies two coding phases: (a)
unitizing and (b) reassembling. In the first, the minimum text
units are detected; in the second phase, the minimum text units
are reassembled and classified as a single explanation if they have
the same pattern of semantic coherence.
The detected explanations are classified according to the
inference field, using five categories, and operationalized
as follows. The examples provided come from the present
data corpus.
1. Monadic. The symptom explanation is sought within
the individual.
Example:
Cl.: “I build up, build up, : : : I don’t know what to call it: : : stress?
I’d burdened myself with too many responsibilities and in the end,
I couldn’t bear them anymore, because I am too emotional: : :”
2. Unidirectional dyadic. The symptom explanation involves
two characters, only one of which has an active influence
on the other.
Example:
Cl.: “I suffered from anorexia for many years. I recently overcame
it, : : : I think it was because of my mother, she has always wanted
me to be perfect, she has always criticized me for every small flaw.”
3. Bidirectional dyadic. The symptom explanation entails two
characters, both of them are actively involved.
Example:
Cl.: “I felt bad because he was improving, he was becoming better
and better and I wasn’t able to keep up with him.”
4. Triadic. The symptom explanation involves three or more
characters but only partially links them.
affected by obsessive–compulsive disorder (F42). The third one is composed of
eight clients affected by eating disorders: four with anorexia nervosa (F50.01 and
F50.02), and four with bulimia nervosa (F50.2). The last group is formed by two
female clients affected by a major depressive disorder (F33.2).
Example:
Cl.: “When my sister found out she had Crohn’s disease she drove
herself crazy: : : and my husband had just come back from the
hospital and he wanted to be served: : : I’ve carried the weight
of these two sick people on my shoulders: : : I felt tremendously
guilty: : : then boom! Vomiting has always been my way of
reacting, and look at me!”
5. “Systemic” triadic. The symptom explanation involves three
or more actors, linking them in a circular gestalt.
Example:
Th.: “without this thick layer of fat how would it be possible for
you to stay at home? You have the will to live: : : you are energetic,
talkative, you could also be very attractive: : : then again you feel
that your mother is alone, unable to involve your dad, who is still
very involved with his family of origin”
The content of each explanation was coded in five
categories, three of which corresponded with those used by
Schweizer et al. (2010).
1. Traumas and external events. Symptoms are attributed to
events, which the client considers traumatic or constructs
as external. Such events could also be positive, nonetheless,
clients believe they have no control over them.
Examples:
Cl.: “A promotion was forthcoming and it caused me very
intense anxiety.”
Cl.: “I don’t know, I believe that my panic attacks stem from the
violence that I underwent when I was 8 years old. I can’t remember
but there was a trial. And then there is a curious fact: : : when I
was doing mental visualizations, I kept seeing the window of a
garage: : : but I didn’t understand why. I talked to my mother and
she told me that, as a matter of fact, I was raped in a garage.”
2. Biomedical explanations. Symptoms are attributed to
genetic or hereditary factors, to organic diseases, or to
physiological dysfunctions of the client.
Examples:
Cl.: “Even my grandmother had panic attacks. She never wanted
to leave her home. Sometimes I managed to convince her to go
out. My mother says it’s a hereditary thing, I agree with her.”
Cl.: “In our family depression has a long history: : :. My brother
killed himself because he was afraid of sinking into depression
again. Also, my dad committed suicide. In any case, his mother –
my grandmother who I resemble- had always been depressed. So,
it’s not so hard to understand why I am depressed. So far all the
physicians I consulted have the same opinion.”
3. Personality traits. Symptoms are attributed to stable
personality traits.
Examples:
Cl.: “I am the most insecure and hesitant person in the world. My
father has always said: ‘You are afraid of everything.’ And it’s true,
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I’ve always been like that! Before I suffered from gastritis, and now
I have this kind of thing.”
Cl.: “I am a black sheep, like my grandfather. I got my temper
from my father, who is a rebel like me. But they are males, and
in my house, there is space for a male black sheep, but not for
a female one. Indeed, they are fine, whereas I’ve been diagnosed
with bipolar disorder.”
4. Intrapsychic conflicts. Symptoms are attributed to dilemmas
or conflicts within the person.
Examples:
Cl.: “They told me that all these controls (compulsive behavior)
stem from guilty feelings. Actually, they started with the sexual
problem. At the time of University, I began to have strong desires
and guilty feelings connected to masturbation.”
Cl.: “I don’t know why I’ve always had these (panic) attacks. I don’t
know, maybe it is because I like to wander alone, I would also like
to travel alone but then I’m scared. I am always fighting between
the desire to do, go, see and the fear that something will happen
to me.”
5. Interpersonal conflicts. Symptoms are attributed to
interpersonal conflicts or difficulties.
Examples:
Cl.: “I’ve really suffered due to the envy and the jealousy I had
toward my sister. She has always been thin as a twig. I wanted to
imitate her but all of my diets were failures, so I began to vomit.”
Cl.: “I feel like I’m choking, I get anxious, especially with my
husband, you know, as happens in all relationships, there are these
tangles: : : which make me (miming to choke herself). Yes, I feel a
tightness in my stomach and I get tremendously anxious.”
A coder identified and coded the inference fields of all the
explanations provided during the 50 sessions. A second coder
analyzed the explanations detected in 25% of all the sessions
(n = 200). For the inference fields, the inter-rater agreement is
0.77, while for the etiopathogenetic explanations. Cohen’s kappa
is higher (0.86).
Data Analysis
The participants produced 744 explanations during the 50
analyzed sessions, on average, 14.94 per session (range: 12–71).
The data were analyzed:
 By frequencies of units in the coding categories and
interactions between categories
 By case (client and therapist) as an observation unit
The study design includes the following variables: speaker
(client–therapist), inference field, and content. In order to
obtain an adequate frequency in each cell, the inference field
variable was collapsed into its three main levels: monadic,
dyadic, and triadic. Also, the content variable was clustered
in three main categories: external causes (trauma and external
events), intrapersonal characteristics (biomedical explanations,
personality traits, intrapsychic conflicts), and interpersonal
dilemma and conflicts.
A log-linear analysis Speaker (2)  Inference field
(3)  Content (3) was carried out on the data set of all the
explanations provided by clients and therapist (N = 744).
Yates’s chi-squared test and z-scores were performed on each
couple (N = 25) and of both individuals (N = 25). In order
to compare the client’s and therapist’s explanatory contributions
using the analysis by each case, a factor model Inference
field  Speaker was carried out on the detected explanations.
Furthermore, two variables were devised: the most frequent
inference field (mfIF) and the broadest inference field (bIF).
RESULTS
Did Clients Provide More Explanations
Than the Therapist?
As hypothesized, the clients were the main players of the
symptom explanations during the two sessions. They provided
71% of total explanations detected during the therapeutic
conversation of the first two sessions (529 vs. 215).
The analysis by case shows that each client provided, on
average, 21.28 explanations of his or her symptoms (s = 8.48),
whereas the therapist, with each client, provided, on average, 8.60
(s = 8.33) explanations of his or her symptoms.
The difference is significant, even if using an alternative one-
tailed hypothesis: t(24) = 6.58, p < 0.001.
The first hypothesis thus received full confirmation with both
kinds of analyses (by frequencies and by case).
Did Explanations With a Narrower
Inference Field Prevail Over Explanations
With a Broader Inference Field During
the Therapeutic Conversation?
The frequency analysis (N = 744) shows that the monadic
explanations were the most frequent (50.54%), the unidirectional
dyadic were in second place (35.22%), followed by the
bidirectional dyadic (8.46%), and finally – with a considerable
gap – the triadic explanations (5.78%) followed. Therefore, the
trend was ordinal, regardless of whether we take into account five
or three levels.
The log-linear analysis Speaker  Inference field  Content
shows the significance of the main effect inference field: the
differences between each level of the breadth of the inference field
are significant (see Table 1).
The analysis by case highlights a similar trend. The most
frequently used inference field by each client–therapist couple
(N = 25) was the monadic one: being the most used for 15 out
of 25 couples, and on average, each couple used 15 monadic
explanations (M = 15.04). The dyadic one followed: for 10 out of
25 couples, it was the most frequent inference field. On average,
each couple used 13 dyadic explanations. None of the couples
resorted mainly to the triadic inference field, and on average, each
couple used less than two triadic explanations (M = 1.72).
Yates’s chi-squared test confirms the significance of the
differences between levels: $2(2) = 12.09, p < 0.01. Moreover, the
monadic inference field was significantly the most used by the
client–therapist couple: z = 2.31, p < 0.05.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 597
fpsyg-11-00597
M
ay
2,2020
Tim
e:20:32
#
7
U
gazio
etal.
E
xplaining
S
ym
ptom
s
in
S
ystem
ic
Therapy
TABLE 1 | Frequencies, percentages, and standardized parameters of significant effects resulting from the log-linear standardized parameter analysis (N = 744).
N Standardized parameters
Effect Content Content
A External 106 14.25% External  3:801***
CONTENT Intrapersonal 251 33.74% Intrapersonal  2:128
Interpersonal 387 52.01% Interpersonal 8:749***
Total 744 100%
Inference field Inference field
B Monadic 376 50.54% Monadic 9:743***
INFERENCE FIELD Dyadic 325 43.68% Dyadic 3:168**
Triadic 43 5.78% Triadic  7:203***
Total 744 100%
C Speaker Speaker
SPEAKER Clients 529 71.1022% Clients 3:201**
Therapist 215 28.8978% Therapist  3:201**
Total 744 100%
Inference field Inference field
AB Monadic Dyadic Triadic Total Monadic Dyadic Triadic
CONTENT  INFERENCE FIELD CONTENT External 82 23 1 106 CONTENT External 2:059  0:755  0:667
Intrapersonal 228 22 1 251 Intrapersonal 5:683***  2:558  1:527
Interpersonal 66 280 41 387 Interpersonal  10:803*** 4:789*** 3:266**
Total 376 325 43 744
Speaker Speaker
AC Clients Therapist Total Clients Therapist
CONTENT  SPEAKER CONTENT External 84 22 106 CONTENT External 1:403  1:403
Intrapersonal 199 52 251 Intrapersonal 1:949  1:949
Interpersonal 246 141 387 Interpersonal  3:410** 3:410**
Total 529 215 744
BC Speaker Speaker
INFERENCE FIELD  SPEAKER Clients Therapist Total Clients Therapist
INFERENCE FIELD Monadic 285 91 376 INFERENCE FIELD Monadic 2:755*  2:755*
Dyadic 236 89 325 Dyadic 5:510***  5:510***
Triadic 8 35 43 Triadic  5:493*** 5:493***
Total 529 215 744
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 with Bonferroni.
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These results allow us to affirm that the variable breadth
of the inference field identifies levels of increasing complexity
in the construction of symptom explanations. It was a trend
which seems to follow an economic principle: the most frequent
explanations were the least complex, even when the meaning-
making involves enigmatic behaviors, such as symptoms.
Did the Explanations of Symptoms
Provided by the Therapist Have a
Broader Inference Field Than the Ones
Given by Her Clients? Did the Therapist
Utilize Triadic Thinking More Than Her
Clients?
The log-linear analysis Speaker  Inference field  Content,
carried out on the detected explanations produced during the
50 sessions (N = 744), allows us to answer affirmatively to
this question.
The interaction Speaker  Inference field is significant,
as shown in Table 1. These data enable us to identify the
direction of the differences between the therapist and the client.
Clients utilized more monadic and dyadic explanations than the
therapist, and fewer triadic ones. The gap between the therapist
and her clients in the triadic explanations was evident: 16.28% of
the total explanations versus 1.51%. The systemic explanations
provided by the clients were nearly all absent: only one client
utilized this kind of explanation, while the systemic explanations
were approximately half of all the triadic explanations provided
by the therapist.
The log-linear analysis (see Table 1) shows also a significant
effect of the interaction Content  Inference field, which
is self-evident.
The factor model Inference field Speaker, carried out on the
explanations given by the 25 client–therapist couples, reveals a
significant interaction between the two factors [F(2.48) = 14.75,
p < 0.001; partial !2 = 0.38]. The clients’ explanations were
nearly exclusively monadic and dyadic, whereas the therapist’s
explanations had an almost balanced distribution (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, the following variables were analyzed for each
speaker: the mfIF and the bIF. Yates’s chi-squared test, applied
to the variable mfIF, only for clients, highlights a significant
difference between the three considered levels (monadic, dyadic,
FIGURE 1 | Inference fields used by clients and therapist for the symptom
explanations (N = 25).
and triadic): $2(2) = 12.09, p < 0.01, as shown in Table 2.
For clients,9 the monadic inference field was significantly the
most frequent, while the triadic inference field was the least
frequent. For the therapist, there were no significant differences
for this variable.
The application of z-scores to the variable bIF shows
significant client–therapist differences in two out of the three
levels of this variable. The broadest inference field used by the
clients was dyadic, while the broadest inference field used by the
therapist was triadic (see Table 2).
The third hypothesis is thus also confirmed: the therapist
provided more complex explanations, that is, with a broader
inference field than the clients. The therapist also utilized the
triadic explanatory level to a greater extent than her clients.
Did the Client’s and Therapist’s
Explanations Differ in Terms of Content
as Well?
The interpersonal explanations were 50% of all explanations
(n = 744). The traumatic and the intrapersonal ones were
respectively 14.11 and 32.52%, of which the biomedical
ones were 6.45%.
The log-linear analysis (see Table 1) shows a significant
effect of the interaction Content  Speaker. As the standardized
parameter analysis highlights, the therapist utilized fewer
traumatic (10.23 vs. 15.87) and intrapersonal (24.18 vs. 37.61)
explanations than her clients, whereas the therapist utilized more
9Of the explanations, 3.36% were classified in a residual category which gathers
explanations with different types of contents or adopted when the coders were
uncertain about coding.
TABLE 2 | Most frequent and broadest inference field used by clients and
therapist: frequencies, percentages, and zeta scores (analysis by case, N = 25)
Most frequent inference field
Clients Monadic Dyadic Triadic
N (=25) 15 10 0
% 60 40 0
Z 2.31* 0.58  2.89**
Therapist
N (=25) 11 10 4
% 44 40 16
Z 0.92 0.58  1.50
Broadest inference field
Clients Monadic Dyadic Triadic
N (=25) 0 20 5
% 0 80 20
Therapist
N (=25) 2 8 15
% 8 32 60
Z  1.44 3.42**  2.89**
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001.
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interpersonal explanations (65.58 vs. 46.50). It is interesting to
notice that, beyond these differences, they both show a similar
trend in terms of frequency, with the interpersonal explanations
in first place, the intrapersonal explanations in second, and lastly,
traumatic explanations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Both the analyses by frequencies and by case confirmed the
hypotheses of this study, which explored a variable – the
breadth of the inference field of the explanations – not hitherto
empirically tested. The exploratory nature of this study is also set
by its main limit: the number of participants is rather small, and
all the sessions were conducted by the same therapist.
The results show that the clients proved to be the main
characters of the attributive plot, while the therapist’s role seemed
secondary but not marginal. Even in the early sessions, and in
coherence with its technique, the systemic interview was able
to restore an agency to the clients that had previously been
undermined by their symptoms. Prompted by the therapist’s
questions, the clients elaborated on the majority of explanations,
hypotheses, and conjectures of their symptoms. The therapist also
introduced some explanations, but the responsibility for making
sense of their symptoms was mainly taken by their clients. This
result is an indirect confirmation that the therapist, in coherence
with the systemic technique of conducting the therapeutic session
(Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980; Tomm, 1987,1988), primarily
maintained a maieutic position during the sessions, which some
systemic therapists have dubbed “a position of not-knowing”
(Anderson and Goolishian, 1992, p. 28). In this perspective,
therapists help their clients to construct, refine, and change
their point of view, and consequently their emotions, through
their method of questioning rather than assuming an instructive
position, which inevitably undermines the client’s agency.
The breadth of the inference field variable was characterized
by an ordinal trend: monadic explanations prevailed (50.53),
dyadic explanations followed (43.69), and triadic ones were in
last place, with a considerable gap between them and the others
(5.78). Hence, this variable seems to gauge levels of increasing
complexity from the monad to the triad, and triadic thinking
resulted uncommon, at least, for the analyzed therapeutic
conversation. Each client–therapist couple provided an average
of less than two triadic explanations during the first two sessions.
As hypothesized, the explanations put forward by the therapist
had a broader inference field than those provided by the client.
This finding was confirmed by all the analyses, and it is perhaps
the most significant result of this study. The therapist’s attributive
trend proved to be different from that of her clients. The
therapist also provided fewer triadic explanations than dyadic
and monadic ones, but her triadic explanations reached 16.28%,
while the clients’ percentage was insignificant (1.51%). Nearly
the total of triadic explanations was provided by the therapist,
who had already begun to introduce hypotheses and problem
redefinitions in the first two sessions, resorting to triadic schemes.
Similarly, support was borne out for the hypothesis that
systemic therapists utilized more interpersonal explanations
than their clients. A less predictable finding was that the
interpersonal explanations were the most frequently used by
clients in their narrated story of symptoms and symptomatic
behaviors. Clients, at least our participants who had chosen a
systemic therapist, proposed relatively few biomedical (6.45%) or
traumatic (14.11%) explanations for their symptoms.
These findings allow us to confirm what was supported by
the previous study (Ugazio et al., 2012) of which this is a
development: that triadic thinking is extraneous, although not
unknown, to common sense. Triadic explanations were produced
almost exclusively by the therapist. Our results also confirm that
the variable breadth of the inference field has an ordinal nature;
therefore, it is characterized by levels of increasing complexity.
It is worth mentioning some differences between our
results and those of Ugazio et al. (2012) in which all the
participants were students. Our clients provided fewer triadic
and monadic explanations than the students, respectively 1.51%
versus 4.7% and 3.88% versus 60%, but used more dyadic
explanations (44.61%, vs. 35.3%). These differences are an
additional confirmation that the triadic hermeneutic seems
extraneous to common sense. The study’s findings were achieved
in a valid ecological context, more reliable than the stimulus
situations utilized by Ugazio et al. (2012), where the evoked
context was manipulated. Furthermore, these findings arise from
conversations between clients and their systemic therapist, who,
as we have already highlighted, elicited broad inference fields
with an interviewing method based on reflexive and circular
questions. These questions widen the conversation to the clients’
entire relational context, as well to positionings of the family
members and to family interactive patterns. Nevertheless, even
in this context, apart from some exceptions, clients did not access
the triadic level. In addition, the majority of explanations with a
triadic inference field found in the Ugazio et al. (2012) study had
arisen from the triadic enigmatic context, an artificial stimulus
situation that tends to force the use of triadic explanations.
The prevalence, for both client and therapist, of interpersonal
explanations compared to intrapersonal and traumatic ones
implies that, already at the beginning of the therapeutic
process, both shared a relational perspective able to favor the
therapeutic alliance.
The majority of our participants did not fully embrace
psychopathological intrapersonal explanations for disorders
(either biomedical or those based on intrapsychic traits and
conflicts), which seem so predominant in other studies, at least
in the United States (Lebowitz and Appelbaum, 2019). This
contrasting trend may reflect an important contextual difference:
in Italy, direct-to-consumer advertising for psychotropic drugs is
still not allowed, while in the United States, these commercials
have very successfully broadcast biochemical explanations of
mental disorders and a related conception of disorders as
an individual problem. However, even in our sample, the
client’s and therapist’s positions were distant because the
therapist significantly used more interpersonal explanations
than her clients.
We can conclude that our exploratory study, showing that
clients and therapists used different inference fields, offers a
validation of a premise of one of the most accepted ideas of
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change in systemic therapies. This is the idea that people change
when, thanks to triadic thinking, they gain a new perspective
on their past, symptoms, and positions in the contexts they
belong to (Sluzki, 1992; Coulehan et al., 1998). According to this
perspective, a crucial component of the therapeutic change is
precisely the dissonance between client and therapist regarding
the inference fields utilized. Thanks to this dissonance, clients
and therapists can create a new story, potentially able to change
the clients’ feelings, without disconfirming their emotions (Burk
et al., 1998; Heatherington et al., 2005). Our study is not able
to support this perspective of change, as this was not among
our aims. Its design limits the analysis to the inference fields
of the first two sessions; furthermore, it did not explore the
clients’ feedback to the therapist’s explanations. According to its
objectives, our study supported a fundamental premise on which
this perspective is based, that client and therapist adopt different
inference fields.
Although clear and in coherence with a previous study (Ugazio
et al., 2012), our findings cannot be generalized, because of the
small number of participants. However, this study provides the
instruments to make it replicable. Future investigations should
increase the number of participants. Moreover, a comparison
between sessions conducted by different therapists, also with
different clinical models, could prove of great interest. The
comparison between the first sessions and the subsequent ones
could allow verifying if clients of systemic therapists widen their
inference field, embracing the triadic hermeneutics introduced
by their therapists. Lastly, how the client and the therapist
co-construct triadic explanations during the sessions could
be a captivating topic for qualitative studies coherent with a
constructionist perspective.
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